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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

8 November 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Members of the Washington Special
Action Group

SUBJECT : Activities of WSAG Working Group C -
Intelligence

1. Attached for the information and use of WSAG members is a joint CIA/DIA estimate of Communist military presence in South Vietnam as of 1 November 1972. In this study we have departed from the usual methodology of presenting "threat" estimates which include enemy forces actually located outside of South Vietnam. With but a few exceptions -- some units operating in both MR 4 and Cambodia -- we have included only those units for which we have firm unit indicators and which are physically located within South Vietnam. From this basic study, two related projects are in train:

a. An estimate of this Communist South Vietnam force's resupply and logistic maintenance requirements.

b. A set of maps plotting the best and most current available data on these troops' locations.

2. Draft studies have been prepared by appropriate U.S. intelligence community components on [redacted]

[redacted] These are now being reviewed and melded by Working Group C. Their findings will be combined into a consolidated report to the WSAG as soon as possible.

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DIA review(s) completed.

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3. Staff planning is also actively in train on the size and shape of the intelligence components of the U.S. Mission in Saigon and the complementary assets or manpower to be positioned elsewhere in Southeast Asia (e.g., Thailand). To complete this planning and make it conform to the real world, we will need guidance on:

a. The validity of one of our basic working assumptions: that the U.S. intelligence community will be expected to provide timely information on whether overall Communist behavior in the early post-cease-fire period does or does not suggest a Vietnamese Communist intention to comply with the provisions of the settlement agreement.

b. The extent of compliance-monitoring data that any supervisory mechanism established by the settlement agreement can be expected to provide.

4. In connection with (b) above, our working assumption is that any U.S. assets or personnel -- especially uniformed military personnel -- required to support the agreement's supervisory mechanism will not be charged against planning constraints such as the tentative 50-man military personnel ceiling.

George A. Carver, Jr.
George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Chairman, Working Group C

Attachment

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Passed out by Mr. Carver at the 8 Nov 72 WSAG

Copy No. _____

- Copy No. 12 - Dr. Kissinger
- Copy No. 13 - Under Secretary Johnson
- Copy No. 14 - Deputy Assistant Secretary Sullivan
- Copy No. 15 - Deputy Secretary Rush
- Copy No. 16 - Assistant Secretary Nutter
- Copy No. 17 - Admiral Moorer
- Copy No. 19 - Mr. Holdridge (NSC Staff)
- Copy No. 20 - Mr. Kennedy (NSC Staff)
- Copy No. 23 - Admiral Gayler (CINCPAC)

- Copies 18, 21 and 22 - SAVA
- 1 - ADDI w/o att
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1- Doc w/o att 18 & 21
1- Doc Choro w/o att

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